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THE DETENTION OF MATERIAL
WITNESSES AND THE FOURTH

AMENDMENT*
Joseph G. Cook"
INTRODUCTION

In June 2005, Human Rights Watch and the American
Civil Liberties Union published a lengthy report entitled Witness to Abuse: Human Rights Abuses Under the Material Witness Law Since September 11.1 The report began:
Since the attacks on September 11, 2001, at least seventy
men living in the United States-all Muslim but one-have
been thrust into a Kafkaesque world of indefinite detention
without charges, secret evidence, and baseless accusations of
terrorist links. They have found themselves not at
Guant~namo Bay or Abu Ghraib but in America's own federal
prison system, victims of the misuse of the federal material
witness law in the U.S. government's fight against terrorism.'

The law referred to is the federal material witness statute,3 which authorizes the arrest and detention of an individu-

* Originally presented as the James Otis Lecture at the National Center for
Justice and the Rule of Law, University of Mississippi School of Law, September
28, 2005.
Williford Gragg Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law.
Human Rights Watch, Witness to Abuse: Human Rights Abuses Under the
available at
11
(2005),
Since
September
Witness
Law
Material
http://hrw.org/reports/2005/us0605/us0605.pdf [hereinafter WITNESS TO ABUSE].
2 Id. at 1.

3 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2000).
If it appears from an affidavit filed by a party that the testimony of a
person is material in a criminal proceeding, and if it is shown that it

MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 76

al whose testimony is material in a criminal proceeding.4 The
statute is not a part of the U.S. Patriot Act, and that fact has
probably prevented it from garnering too much attention. Quite
to the contrary, it has been around, with but minor changes,
for over two hundred years, first appearing in the Judiciary Act
of 1789.' Its ostensible purpose is to assure the availability of
testimony of witnesses who might otherwise elude a subpoena.
The unique feature of this statute is that it authorizes the
arrest and detention of individuals who have not and are not
even suspected of committing any crime. And yet, the statute
provides that once arrested, they are to be treated "in accordance with the provisions of section 3142.6 Section 3142 is
entitled, "Release or detention of a defendant pending trial."' If
we incorporate the standards for the release of defendants
pending trial into the material witness statute, then it would
seem to follow that a material witness should be detained only
so long as may be necessary to set bail or other conditions. If
the witness is unable to satisfy the conditions set for release,
then a deposition should be taken forthwith, followed by the

may become impracticable to secure the presence of the person by subpoena, a judicial officer may order the arrest of the person and treat the
person in accordance with the provisions of section 3142 of this title. No
material witness may be detained because of inability to comply with
any condition of release if the testimony of such a witness can adequately be secured by deposition, and if further detention is not necessary to
prevent a failure of justice. Release of a material witness may be delayed for a reasonable period of time until the deposition of the witness
can be taken pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Id.
, Material witness statutes are also found in almost all states. They are, in
the main, comparable to the federal statute, though they vary in detail. In some
instances, detention is authorized only so long as may be necessary to take a
deposition. See, e.g., COLO. CONsT. art II, § 17; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 23; S.D.
CODIFIED LAW § 23A-12-1 (1979); N.D. R. CRIM. P. 15 (detention not to exceed six
hours). Some place strict limits on the length of the detention. See, e.g., ARIz.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4803 (1978) (maximum of three days); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 902.17 (West 2001) (same); MD. CODE ANN., CTs. & JUD. PROC. § 9-203 (West
1974) (seven days unless a judge authorizes additional period).
5 Ch. 20, §§ 30, 33, 1 Stat. 73, 88-91.
6 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2000).
' 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (2000).
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release.
In reality, however, today the law is used primarily for a
different purpose, to wit: "to secure the indefinite incarceration
of those [the Department of Justice] has wanted to investigate
as possible terrorist suspects."' Certainly it is open to question
whether such use is even authorized by the statute. In any
case, the use of the law has been accompanied by a broad range
of constitutional abuses which have been cataloged by courts
and commentators.
What has been neglected is the underlying assumption of
the law, and that will be the focus of my remarks. That is, is
the very act of arresting and detaining individuals who are not
themselves charged with any criminal activity irreconcilable
with the protection of the Fourth Amendment?
One might think that, given a two hundred year window of
opportunity, questions regarding the constitutionality of the
statute would have been fully explored and its validity beyond
peradventure. This seems to be a common assumption. Upon
close scrutiny, however, the assumption does not appear to be
warranted.
The constitutionality of the practice has never been addressed by the Supreme Court, though many courts and commentators appear to think that it has. No lower court has ever
elected to grapple with the question, or perhaps no litigants
have ever forced any to do so.9 If we subject the practice of
detaining material witnesses to a traditional Fourth Amendment analysis, there is little to be found in the way of supporting precedent. And if, being at a loss for viable precedent, we
resort to a device occasionally used by the Supreme Court in
cases of first impression-that is, determining those investiga-

WITNESS TO ABUSE, supra note 1, at 1.
I am not suggesting that no court has ever considered the implications of
the Fourth Amendment in the interpretation or application of the statute. But the
question has always been concerned with the details. For example, what probable
cause showing is required to make an arrest under the statute? Can such an
arrest be made without prior judicial authorization? Never, so far as I have been
able to determine, has the question been asked, is the practice of detaining material witnesses per se unconstitutional.
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tive practices recognized by the common law at the time of the
American Revolution and labeling them reasonable by virtue of
tradition-that too will fail to vindicate the law.
One is thus led to the anomalous conclusion that the statute is assumed to be constitutional because it has always been
so assumed. This brings to mind Professor Felix S. Cohen's
observation in 1935 in a landmark article in the Columbia Law
Review 1° that if a court says something three times, it begins
to believe that it is true. 1
Of course, today many people do not want to hear an argument that if accepted would frustrate the efforts to counteract
terrorism. But here, if anywhere, at the National Center for
Justice and the Rule of Law, the felt necessities of the times
cannot permit the end to justify the means.
There is a memorable scene in Robert Bolt's play, A Man
for All Seasons, in which Sir Thomas More, Lord Chancellor, is
visited by Richard Rich, and the two engage in an exchange
that foreshadows More's eventual downfall.12 When Rich departs, More's friend, William Roper, entreats him to arrest
Rich.13 More responds that Rich has broken no law, and that
even if Rich were the Devil himself, he would not be subject to
arrest until he broke the law.14 The dialogue continues:
ROPER: So now you'd give the Devil benefit of law!

"0 Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35
COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935).
" Id. at 820. Cohen quoted "The Hunting of the Snark, Fit the First" by
Lewis Carroll:
"Just the place for a Snark!" the Bellman cried,
As he landed his crew with care;
Supporting each man on the top of the tide
By a finger entwined in his hair.
"Just the place for a Snark! I have said it twice:
That alone should encourage the crew.
"Just the place for a Snark! I have said it thrice:
What I tell you three times is true."
Id. at 820 n.31.
12 ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS 62-65 (Random House 1962).
" Id. at 65.
14 Id. at 65-66.
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MORE: Yes. What would you do? Cut a great road through
the law to get after the Devil?
ROPER: I'd cut down every law in England to do that!
MORE: . . . Oh?... And when the last law was down, and
the Devil turned round on you-where would you hide, Roper,
the laws all being flat?... This country's planted thick with
laws from coast to coast-man's laws, not God's-and if you cut
them down-and you're just the man to do it-d'you really
think you could stand upright in the winds that would blow
then? ... Yes, I'd give the Devil benefit of law, for my own
safety's sake.15
To put the matter before us in the starkest terms, the
material witness statute empowers the government to arrest
and detain individuals who have not broken the law. The question I address today is whether such a practice should be constitutionally sustained.
THE CASE OF OSAMA AWADALLAH
I turn then to a story for our times.
On the afternoon of September 11, 2001, only hours after
the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, FBI agents
located a car in the Dulles Airport parking lot owned by Nawaf
AJ-Hazmi. 5 Al-Hazmi was believed to have been among the
terrorists who crashed Flight 77 into the Pentagon. 17 Inside
the car was a scrap of paper upon which had been written
"Osama" and a seven digit phone number. 8 The phone number was identified with an address in San Diego and a former
resident at that address went by the name Osama
Awadallah."9 Awadallah had not lived there for eighteen
months.2 °
's Id. at 66.

United States v. Awadallah, (Awadallah I/), 349 F.3d 42, 45 (2d Cir. 2003)
rev'g 202 F. Supp. 2d 82 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), cert. denied sub nom. Awadallah v.
United States, 543 U.S. 1056 (2005), affd, 436 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2006).
16

17 Id.
Is Id.
19 Id.
20

Id.

590
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So far as the case indicates, this piece of paper is the only
connection between Awadallah and the events under investigation. Moreover, so far as the case indicates, at no time thereafter did authorities garner evidence sufficient to charge or even
suspect Awadallah of involvement in any terrorist activity. In
fact, no criminal charges were ever brought. Awadallah was
detained solely as a material witness.
Nine days later, a group of eight federal agents gathered in
the vicinity of Awadallah's San Diego apartment.2 They received no response at the door, but shortly thereafter an individual recognized by the agents as Awadallah's roommate arrived.22 The agents accompanied him into the apartment and
questioned him for two to three hours.2 3
Meanwhile, Awadallah, who was a student at Grossmont
College, was attending a course in "English as a Second Language."" Upon his return to the apartment, he was met by
seven or eight agents in the parking lot.25 Agent Rielly told
him that they needed to talk for about thirty minutes at the
FBI's office and that he could follow them there in his own
car.2" Awadallah asked why the interview could not take place
in his apartment.2 7 After conferring with another agent, Rielly
changed his mind and told Awadallah to leave his car in the
parking lot and that he would be driven to the FBI office.28

21

United States v. Awadallah, (Awadallah 1),

202 F. Supp. 2d

82, 87

(S.D.N.Y. 2002), rev'd, 349 F. 3d 42 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied sub nom.
Awadallah v. United States, 543 U.S. 1056 (2005), affd, 436 F.3d 125 (2d Cir.
2006).
22 Id.
23 Id. at 87-88.
24

Id. at 88.

25 Id.

Later, Awadallah claimed that there were fifteen to twenty agents in

the parking lot, but this testimony was not credited by the district court. Id. at
88 n.9.
26 Id. at 88.
27 Id.
28 Id.
Agent Rielly testified that the change in plans was made "for safety
reasons." Id. at 88-89 n.ll. He opined that Awadallah "might, on the way to the
field office, try to cause an accident, try to harm the agents in some way." Id.
(citation omitted). No reason was given for considering Awadallah to be dangerous. Indeed, Agent Teixeira testified, "[W]e did not consider him a suspect of
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Before they left, Agent Rielly induced Awadallah to sign a
consent form agreeing to a search of his apartment and car,
noting that if he refused to consent, they would obtain a search
9
warrant and "tear up the home."
At the FBI office, Awadallah was interrogated for six
hours.3" In the end, the agents told him that "he had been cooperative and that they believed him but, in order to 'clean the
table,' they wanted him to take a lie detector test" the following
morning." FBI Agent Teixeira would later testify that "[aifter
the six-hour interview, 'there was no reason. . . to consider
[Awadallah] a suspect."'32
After being driven home, Awadallah discussed the day's
events with his three brothers who told him that they were
going to retain an attorney to represent him, and that he
should not take the lie detector test prior to consulting with his
attorney and he agreed.3 3
Early the following morning, Awadallah informed Agent
Teixeira of his decision to talk to a lawyer.3 4 Teixeira assured
him that that would not be necessary, that it would be "a short
test," after which he would not be "bother[ed] . .. anymore. " "
When Awadallah resisted, Teixeira said "refusal to take the
exam that morning would indicate that [he] was hiding something, and Agent Rielly would 'get a warrant for [his arrest]." ' "Believing that he had no choice," Awadallah took the
test.37 When the test was completed, he was told that the
polygraph indicated that he had lied in responding to two questions:

anything so there was no reason for us to consider him a suspect, that he would
be a fugitive." Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
29 Id.
at 89-90 (citation omitted).
3 Id. at 92.
31 Id. at 92 (citation omitted).
32 Id. at 93. (third alteration in original).
3 Id.
34

Id.
Id. (citation omitted).
31 Id.
(citation omitted). Nothing in the record suggests that the FBI had
probable cause to support the issuance of an arrest warrant.
37 Id.
'
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"(a) Did you know beforehand of any specific plans to destroy any of those U.S. targets, on 9/11/2001? Answer-No.
(b) Did you participate in any way in any of those
attacks against U.S. targets, on 9/11/2001? Answer38
No."
At this point, it became evident that Awadallah would not
be permitted to leave. He was "told ...that he was 'one of the
terrorists' and he knew about the September 11th attacks in
advance." 9 Awadallah repeatedly requested to attend Friday
prayer and eventually was told that he not only would miss
Friday prayer, but that he would be flown to New York and
detained "for one year ... [to] "'find out' more about him."4"
When he asserted his right to a lawyer, he was told that he
had no rights.4 '
Without seeking judicial authorization, as required by the
statute, an Assistant United States Attorney instructed the
agents to arrest Awadallah as a material witness.4 2 Some two
and a half to three hours later, an application for a warrant to
arrest Awadallah as a material witness was submitted to a federal judge in the Southern District of New York.43 It alleged
the following: the FBI believed that Nawaf AI-Hazmi was
among the terrorists who crashed Flight 77 into the Pentagon
on September 11th; a car owned by Al-Hazmi had been found
in the Dulles Airport parking lot on the afternoon of September
11th; within the vehicle, agents found a piece of paper which

'
40

Id. at 94.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. (citation omitted).

4' Id. On appeal, the government did not dispute that Awadallah had been
illegally seized on September 20 and September 21. Awadallah 11, 394 F.3d 42,
71 (2d Cir. 2003), rev'g 202 F. Supp. 2d 82 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), cert. denied sub nom.
Awadallah v. United States, 543 U.S. 1056 (2005), affd, 436 F.3d 125 (2d Cir.
2006). Because the ultimate subject of the litigation is a charge of perjury in regard to grand jury testimony, the constitutionality of all the events occurring in
San Diego becomes irrelevant.
"' Awadallah 1, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 94.
41 Id.
at 95. The New York judge was not informed of the earlier arrest in
San Diego. Id.
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bore the inscription "Osama 589-5316;" a telephone database
search had revealed that this was Osama Awadallah's
telephone number; and Awadallah had acknowledged that he
knew A1-Hazmi but claimed few contacts and "'expressed
surprise' that his name and phone number were found" on a
slip of paper in the car." Beyond this, the affidavit referred to
the discovery in searches of Awadallah's cars and apartment, of
"two videotapes concerning the 1993 war in Bosnia,. . . another
videotape about the Koran, . . . 'a box-cutter, and several computer-generated photographs of Usama [sic] bin Laden.""
As to the need to place him under arrest, the affidavit
continued,
"it may become impracticable to secure the presence" of
Awadallah because "he continues to maintain substantial
family ties in Jordan and elsewhere overseas," which "make
him a risk of flight while his admitted connection to the
highjackers [sic] is under investigation. In addition, given
Awadallah's connections to one or more of the hijackers who
committed the terrorist attacks... Awadallah may have an
incentive to avoid appearing before the grand jury. Awadallah
may also be concerned that his prior conduct, as set out
above, may provide a basis for law enforcement authorities to
investigate and possibly prosecute him." 6
On its face, this did not present a compelling case for issuing an arrest warrant. But Federal District Judge Scheindlin
thought that the omission of a number of salient facts from the
affidavit made the case even weaker. For example, the agents
knew that A1-Hazmi had not lived in San Diego for over a year
and more significantly that the telephone number found in the
car had not been Awadallah's for longer than that.47 As for the
"box-cutter," the court noted that it was more properly described as "a push-up razor," which Awadallah said had been

Id. (citation omitted).
4 Id. (citations omitted).
4 Id.
(alteration in original) (citations omitted) (capitalization omitted).
44

41

Id. at 96.
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used as a carpet cutter to install carpet in his apartment.4 8
There were witnesses who provided some support for this explanation.49
To authorize a detention under the statute, the court said
that two explicit requirements must be satisfied: (1) that the
testimony of the party be material, and (2) that securing the
presence of the party by subpoena is impracticable."
As to the question of materiality, the district court cited a
1971 decision from the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
Bacon v. United States,1 wherein the court said that, "[in the
case of a grand jury proceeding, we think that a mere statement by a responsible official, such as a United States Attorney, is sufficient to satisfy [the requirement]. " 52 This, according to the Bacon court, would be the equivalent of probable
cause for an arrest. But the analogy hardly rings true. At least
as early as 1964, in Aguilar v.Texas,5 3 the Supreme Court held
that the mere conclusion of an officer as to the existence of
probable cause would not support the issuance of an arrest
warrant.5 4 And while Aguilar and its progeny5 5 were later repudiated by the Supreme Court" for promulgating an overly
formalistic standard for evaluating affidavits for arrests and
searches, the Court has never deviated from its view that the
determination of probable cause must be made by a judicial
officer, and in that role the judicial officer is not to act as a
rubber stamp. Nevertheless, the Human Rights Watch report
stated, "We are not aware of a single case in which a court
rejected a request for a material witness arrest warrant in a
terrorism-related case since September 11."'

Id. at 96 & n.24 (citation omitted).
Id. at 96 n.24,
50

Id. at 96.

6' 449 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1971).
52 Id.
at 943.
378 U.S. 108 (1964), abrogated by Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
Id. at 113-14.
See, e.g., Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
67 WITNESS TO ABUSE, supra note 1, at 5. "Indeed, our research suggests the
courts rarely even probed the government's grounds for believing a witness would
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In any event, even using this relaxed standard for materiality, the district court found that the affidavit failed because
the agent seeking the judicial order had no knowledge of the
substance of the grand jury's investigation and hence had no
basis for assessing materiality.58 It concluded that "Itihe only
officials who may be able to make an informed decision about a
witness's materiality to the grand jury's investigation are
'[a]ttorneys for the government... [who] may be present while
the grand jury is in session.'"59 But the court of appeals disagreed, concluding that "an FBI agent who works closely with a
prosecutor in a grand jury investigation may satisfy the 'personal knowledge' requirement."0
The district court also found the argument favoring detention, as opposed to the use of a subpoena, to be weak. While
the affidavit alleged that Awadallah had substantial ties to
Jordan, it failed to mention that he also "had substantial ties
to San Diego" in the form of three brothers, one of whom was
an American citizen.6 ' Second, there was no allegation of any
basis for prosecuting Awadallah for "'prior conduct."'6 2 Third,
Awadallah had consistently cooperated with the agents by
consenting to searches of his home and vehicles, accompanying

not comply with a subpoena to testify." Id.
" Awadallah I, 202 F. Supp. 2d 82, 97 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), rev'd, 349 F. 3d 42
(2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied sub non. Awadallah v. United States, 543 U.S. 1056
(2005), affd, 436 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2006). The affidavit read in part:
"As part of the investigation in this matter, I have debriefed other
agents and law enforcement officers who have been involved in this
investigation, and I have reviewed relevant reports, documents and records in this investigation. Because the limited purpose of this affidavit
is to support the issuance of the requested warrant, I have not set forth
all the facts known to me, or to other agents or law enforcement personnel concerning this nationwide investigation. I believe the testimony of
Osama Awadallah would be material to the grand jury's investigation."
Id. at 97 n.25 (capitalization omitted) (quoting Affidavit of Plunkett).
I9 at 97 (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(d)(1)).
Id.
Supp. 2d 82
" Awadallah H, 349 F.3d 42, 66 (2d Cir. 2003), rev'g 202 F.
(S.D.N.Y. 2002), cert. denied sub nom. Awadallah v. United States, 543 U.S. 1056
(2005), affd, 436 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2006),
" Awadallah 1, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 97.
62 Id.
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them to their office for an interview, and acquiescing in "a
polygraph examination without the presence of an attorney." 3
Fourth, "the agents failed to inform the court that the phone
number found in the hijacker's car had not been used by
Awadallah for eighteen months and was last used at a prior
residence."' The district court concluded that "[ilf the misleading information had been removed and the omitted information disclosed, it is overwhelmingly likely that the court
would have found that Awadallah's presence at the grand jury
could have been secured by a subpoena."65
Again, the court of appeals was not persuaded. Affidavits
for arrest and search warrants are traditionally evaluated as
pleadings. That is, if the affidavit contains a prima facie statement of probable cause for the arrest or search requested, a
reviewing court is unlikely to question its accuracy.6" Only in
cases in which the affiant is guilty "of deliberate falsehood or of
reckless disregard for the truth" will a warrant be challengeable on these grounds.6 7 In the present case, the court concluded, there was no basis for finding that the agent "intentionally misled the court or recklessly disregarded the truth.""
Following his arrest pursuant to the material witness warrant, Awadallah was incarcerated in four prisons, ending up in
the New York correctional center.6 9 In the course of the FBI
interrogations, Awadallah was questioned in regard to two
hijackers: Nawaf A1-Hazmi, the owner of the car found at
Dulles Airport, and Khalid Al-Mihdhar.7 ° Awadallah never
denied that he knew Al-Hazmi.7' He acknowledged that there

Id. at 97-98.
Id. at 98.
65 Id.
" See JOSEPH G. COOK, 1 CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED § 4:38
(3d ed. 1996).
e' Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978).
Awadallah 11, 349 F.3d 42, 66 (2d Cir. 2003), rev'g 202 F. Supp. 2d 82
(S.D.N.Y. 2002), cert. denied sub nom. Awadallah v. United States, 543 U.S. 1056
(2005), affd, 436 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2006).
69 Id. at 47.
7' Id. at 47-48.
7
Id. at 48.
's
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had been a second individual, but denied knowing anyone
named "Khalid."72 The agents believed this to be a lie and
were prepared to prove it.
District Judge Scheindlin said:
The government knew that calling Awadallah before the
grand jury placed him in an impossible position. If he testified in a manner consistent with his four prior statements to
federal officials, as was to be expected, he would be indicted
for perjury. If, on the other hand, he now admitted knowing
A1-Mihdhar's name (as opposed to knowing him, which he
repeatedly admitted), he could be indicted for having previously lied to federal officials.73
Either way he responded, Judge Scheindlin observed, "would
have little, if any, impact on the pending investigation."7 4 The
government would, however, finally have a criminal charge
against Awadallah, to wit, perjury, which appeared to be its
only motivation.75
Twenty days after his arrest, on October 10, Awadallah
testified before the grand jury in the Southern District of New
York.76 He acknowledged that he had met two of the hijackers
at work and in his mosque, but stated that he had seen neither
for a year prior to the attacks.77 As expected, Awadallah denied knowing anyone named Khalid.7" The prosecutor thereupon showed him an examination booklet obtained from his English teacher in San Diego, which included a sentence referring
to an acquaintance named Khalid.7 9 Awadallah denied that
72

Id.

Awadallah 1, 202 F. Supp. 2d 82, 109 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), rev'd, 349 F. 3d 42
(2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied sub noin. Awadallah v. United States, 543 U.S. 1056
(2005), affd, 436 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2006).
"

74

Id.

"' Id. In an earlier opinion, Judge Scheindlin had raised the possibility that
Awadallah had been caught in a "perjury trap." He now reluctantly conceded that
"courts have repeatedly held that such a situation does not constitute a 'perjury
trap. Id.
" Awadallah 11, 349 F.3d at 48.
7 Awadallah 1, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 95.
78 Awadallah 11, 349 F.3d at 48.
79

Id.

598
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the reference to Khalid was in his handwriting."
Five days later, he again appeared before the grand jury
and "stated that his recollection of Khalid's name had been
refreshed by his October 10 testimony and that the disputed
writing in the exam booklet was in fact his own.""' He was
thereupon charged with two counts of making false statements
to the grand jury: (1) "falsely denying that he knew Khalid,"
and (2) "falsely denying that the handwriting in the exam booklet was his."82 These two charges of perjury are the only
charges that have ever been brought against Osama
Awadallah.
Of course, the opportunity for Awadallah to commit perjury
only arose because he was arrested and while in custody subjected to interrogation without the benefit of constitutional
protections, which produced the statements that eventually
were the bases for the charges. It is true that courts have held
that witness testimony is not tainted by prior illegalities, such
as an illegal arrest." But to allow this principle to prevail in a
case in which the only basis of a criminal charge is the testimony itself would appear to be the ultimate in prosecutorial bootstrapping.
WHAT LITTLE THE SUPREME COURT HAS SAID

Earlier I noted that surprisingly the Supreme Court has
never been called upon to consider the constitutionality of the
material witness statute. The Court has, however, made isolated statements in two cases which have led some to conclude
that it has spoken on the matter.8

so

Id.

a' Id.
82

Id.

'3See 3 JOSEPH G. COOK, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED § 12:4
(3d ed. 1996).
" See Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953); Barry v. United States ex. rel.
Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597 (1929). There is a third case, New York v. O'Neill, 359
U.S. 1 (1959), in which the only issue before the Court was whether the Uniform
Law to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Within or Without a State in
Criminal Proceedings, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 941.01-942.06 (West 2006); N.Y. CODE
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The first case is Barry v. United States ex rel.
Cunningham' decided in 1929, which concerned a Senate investigation of the validity of the election of a Senator from
Pennsylvania. Cunningham had been a member of an organization that supported the candidate in a primary election."8 He
had been a court clerk for twenty-one years and earned eight
$8,000 annually.8 7 In testimony before the investigating committee he acknowledged giving the chair of the campaign organization $50,000 in cash but refused to identify its source, insisting that it was his money." The President of the Senate
issued a warrant, directing the sergeant-at-arms to take
Cunningham into custody and to hold him pending further
instructions from the Senate. 9 The district court ruled that
the order was not one for contempt but merely compelled
Cunningham "to answer questions pertinent to the matter under inquiry."9 ° The court of appeals reversed, holding that the
arrest was for contempt, but that it was void, because the information sought by the investigating committee was not pertinent to the authorized inquiry.9 1
The Supreme Court concluded that the district court had it
right, and that (1) the Senate was engaged in an inquiry within
its constitutional power;" (2) the Senate was empowered to
issue a warrant of arrest;93 and (3) it was not essential that a
subpoena first be issued, served and disobeyed before the arrest

CRIM. PROC. § 620.20 (McKinney 1995), violated the Privileges and Immunities
Clause. U.S. CONT. art 4, § 2. The court held that it did not. O'Neill, 359 U.S. at
11-12.
279 U.S. 597 (1929).
Id. at 609.
87 Id.
'8 Id.
William S. Vare, the elected Senator at issue, had expended a sum in
excess of $785,000 in the primary election. "Expenditure of such a large sum of
money was declared to be contrary to sound public policy; and the special committee was directed to inquire into the claim of Vare to a seat in the Sen-

ate . ...

Id.
'o Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
ld.
I3

" Id.

at 610.

at 611.
at 612.
at 613-14.
at 616.
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warrant was issued.' By analogy, the Court cited the contemporary version of the material witness provision in the federal
code 5 with the observation, "[tihe constitutionality of this
statute apparently has never been doubted."96 That is the only
thing the Court said pertinent to the present discussion.
Now, to say that the constitutionality of the statute has
never been doubted is not tantamount to saying that its constitutionality has been sustained. Perhaps the reason the constitutionality had never been doubted is because no one had ever
asked the question. The Cunningham Court cited only one
case, United States v. Lloyd,97 an 1860 district court decision,
and said that in that case, "[t]he validity of the statute was not
doubted."9 8 This is true; indeed, if one reads the Lloyd decision, she will discover that the constitutionality of the statute
was not doubted; the statute was not even mentioned. Nor was
there occasion for the witness in the Cunningham case to raise
doubts about the statute because it was not relied upon by the
Senate in ordering his arrest. 99 At most, the Cunningham decision presumes the constitutionality of the statute, albeit in
dicta.
The other case, Stein v. New York,10 decided in 1953,

at 616-17. "[U]ndoubtedly the courts recognize this as the practice gen', Id.
erally to be followed. But undoubtedly also, a court has the power in the exercise
of sound discretion to issue a warrant of arrest without a previous subpoena
when there is good reason to believe that otherwise the witness will not be
forthcoming." Id. at 616.
" 28 U.S.C. § 659 (1940) (repealed 1948). This statute was a "forebear (18
U.S.C.] § 3144." Awadallah 11, 349 F.3d 42, 57 (2d Cir. 2003), rev'g 202 F. Supp.
2d 82 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), cert. denied sub nom. Awadallah v. United States, 543
U.S. 1056 (2005), affd, 436 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2006).
96 Barry, 279 U.S. at 617.
4 Blatchf. 427, F. Cas. 984 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860) (No. 15,614).
'
96 Barry, 279 U.S. at 617.
99 The Court also cited three state decisions in which similar statutes "have
been enforced without question." Id. at 617-18 (citing State ex rel. Howard v.
Grace, 18 Minn. 398 (1872); Crosby v. Potts, 69 S.E. 582 (Ga. Ct. App. 1910); Ex
parte Sheppard, 66 S.W. 304 (Tex. Crim. App. 1902)). For present purposes, it is
sufficient to note that these cases all were decided long before the protection of
the Fourth Amendment had been extended to state proceedings. Neither this nor
any other federal constitutional argument was before the respective courts.
100 346 U.S. 156 (1953).
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contains the passage frequently cited by lower courts as resolving the question. The Stein Court said this:
The duty to disclose knowledge of crime rests upon all citizens. It is so vital that one known to be innocent may be detained, in the absence of bail, as a material witness."'
Well, that appears pretty conclusive does it not? And it is, at
least if you excise those two sentences from the context in
which they appear. But on closer examination, there is less
here than meets the eye. In support of this sentence, the Court
only cites rules of criminal procedure in the federal courts and
the state of New York. So the statement is merely descriptive
of what governments do; it is not prescriptive of what they can
do constitutionally. Not a single case is cited sustaining the
practice, not even the Court's own Cunningham decision.12
Moreover, it turns out that this passage is even weaker
dicta than that in Cunningham. In that case, it was at least
possible that the courier with $50,000 was a material witness
to some skullduggery. But in Stein there is not a material witness in sight. Stein is a straight-forward criminal case in which
two defendants had been convicted of felony murder and sentenced to death. Their challenge to the admissibility of their
confessions made a sweeping argument that interrogation was
inherently coercive. The two quoted sentences are imbedded in
a paragraph in which the Court extols the benefits of interrogation to the accused as well as to the government. The full paragraph reads as follows: "[b]y their own answers many suspects
clear themselves, and the information they give frequently
points out another who is guilty. Indeed, interrogation of those
who know something about the facts is the chief means to solution of crime. " 1°3 And then come the two telling sentences:
"[tiheduty to disclose knowledge of crime rests upon all citizens.
101

Id.

at 184 (citation omitted).

Nevertheless, Stein has been cited as controlling authority for the power to
detain material witnesses. See In re Application for a Material Witness Warrant,
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3144, for John Doe, 213 F. Supp. 2d 287 (S.D.N.Y.
2002).
'03 Stein, 346 U.S. at 184.
"
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It is so vital that one known to be innocent may be detained, in
the absence of bail, as a material witness."1 4 And then comes

the point relevant to the defendants: "[t]his Court never has
held that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from
such detention and interrogation of a suspect as under the
circumstances appears reasonable and not coercive."' 5 Hence,
for purposes of the case before the Court, the Court is maintaining that if individuals innocent of all wrongdoing can be
compelled to divulge information regarding crimes, surely individuals such as you, charged with a capital offense, may be
subjected to non-coercive interrogation. 6 But the critical
point is that there are no material witnesses asserting rights in
the case. In short, in the only cases to have reached the Supreme Court in which reference is made to the constitutionality
of the statute, the matter is irrelevant to both the parties and
the issues before the Court. 07

104

Id.

(emphasis added) (citation omitted).

105 Id.
100 The Stein case predates the application of the privilege against self-incrimi-

nation and the right to counsel during interrogation.
1"
There is one additional decision worthy of mention. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533
U.S. 678 (2001), concerned resident aliens against whom a final order of removal
had been entered. During the statutory ninety-day "removal period,"' the alien
was normally held in custody. Id. at 682. Should the alien not be removed during
this period, a statute authorized unlimited detention thereafter. Id. (citing 8
U.S.C. § 1231(aX6)). The Court held that there was an implicit reasonableness
limit on post-removal period detentions, stating:
A statute permitting indefinite detention of an alien would raise a serious constitutional problem. The Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause
forbids the Government to "depriv[e]" any "person . . . of . . . liberty . . . without due process of law." Freedom from imprisonment-from
government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint-lies
at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects. And this Court has said
that government detention violates that Clause unless the detention is
ordered in a criminal proceeding with adequate procedural protections,
or, in certain special and "narrow" nonpunitive "circumstances," where a
special justification, such as harm-threatening mental illness, outweighs
the "individuals' constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical
restraint."
Id. at 690 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
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THE FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS

Lacking a definitive answer from the Supreme Court-or for
that matter, from any other court-how then might this question be analyzed in light of the existing body of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence?
The Fourth Amendment provides that "[tihe right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause.""' It can scarcely be gainsaid that individuals who
have been taken into custody and involuntarily detained ostensibly for the purpose of giving testimony, have been arrested. But to support an arrest, as opposed to something less than
an arrest, the official making the arrest must have probable
cause. Probable cause for an arrest was defined in Beck v.
Ohio ' 9 as "whether at that moment the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the petitioner had committed or was
committing an offense.""10 Similar language has been used by
the Supreme Court in numerous cases before and after
Beck."' While the presence or absence of probable cause has
frequently been a difficult decision, never has it been doubted
that to make an arrest there must be reason to believe that the
subject had committed or was committing an offense. When a
material witness is taken into custody, by definition that is not
the case. Indeed, one federal court" 2 has observed that "individuals detained as material witnesses are rarely charged with
crimes '""' and described the plight of the detained material
witness thus:
U.S. CONST., amend. IV.

379 U.S. 89 (1964).
...Id. at 91 (citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949);
10

Henry v. United States, 361 U.S, 98, 102 (1959)).
'
See, e.g., Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979).
1
In re Class Action Application for Habeas Corpus ex rel. All Material Witnesses in the W. Dist. of Tex., 612 F. Supp. 940 (W.D. Tex. 1985).
"' Id. at 944.
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With no charges lodged against them, material witnesses are
held in custody for periods ranging from several weeks to
several months. If the material witness were charged with a
crime, he would be entitled to appointment of counsel if he
was financially unable to afford one. The material witness is
deprived of liberty without an opportunity to consult with
counsel or to have his interests represented because he is not
charged with a crime. Consequently, individuals that are
incarcerated without being charged with criminal activity are
afforded less114protection than individuals charged with criminal activity.
Recall again the case of Osama Awadallah. At no time,
from the beginning until the end of his story, and even thereafter, did the authorities have probable cause to arrest him for
anything. In fact, they conceded as much. Had they arrested
him at his apartment, they could have taken him into custody,
carried out a search incident to the arrest, and searched his
cars if there was probable cause to believe they contained anything seizable. But in fact, they had nothing on him at all.
Presumably, that is why they finagled him into consenting to
the various searches and attempted to create the impression
that his trips to the FBI office were all at his own volition. Had
they attempted to justify any of these tactics as incident to his
arrest, they undoubtedly would have lost.
Of course, the Supreme Court has recognized circumstances short of probable cause which will support a detention. A
less demanding standard was articulated by the Supreme
Court in Terry v. Ohio"5 for field detentions. In such cases,
only a reasonable suspicion is required. But this line of precedent is equally unavailing. First, the Terry decision merely
adapted the language previously used by the Court in defining
probable cause to arrest so as to apply to field detentions.
Therefore the power to detain also only applies to individuals
suspected of criminal activity, and such has been the case

,, Id. at 944-45.
,15 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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whenever the Court has applied Terry. Second, even if it be
assumed that individuals such as Osama Awadallah are suspected of criminal activity, an additional problem in applying
the Terry rationale is that it only supports field detentions. The
Terry decision and later decisions by the Supreme Court have
held without exception that the detainee cannot be taken
against his will to the stationhouse.' 6 Only if probable cause
legitimately arises during the course of a field detention may
an arrest and possibly an incident search occur. In short, the
most fundamental Fourth Amendment principles will not support taking into custody an individual for whom there is no
probable cause to arrest or even articulable suspicion of criminal activity.
Of course, the response to this analysis may be that the
problem being addressed is sui generis, that the existing precedents are simply inapplicable. We might first observe that the
Supreme Court has shown little patience with attempts to
define away Fourth Amendment issues. For example, the majority opinion in Terry began by rejecting the suggestion that
field detentions are of too low visibility to warrant constitutional scrutiny.11 And in Camara v. Municipal Court,"' the
Court held that the routine activities of building inspectors
were nonetheless searches within the contemplation of the
Fourth Amendment, even though they were not engaged in
criminal investigation.1 9 It would seem, therefore, that the
question raised with respect to material witness detentions
cannot simply be ignored.
When confronted with questions of first impression in
interpreting the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court has
on occasion examined the prevailing practices at the time of the
ratification of the United States Constitution. The idea here is
that the Fourth Amendment enjoins only those searches and
...See Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626 (2003); Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811
(1985); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S.
721 (1969).
...392 U.S. at 8-9.
118 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
119 Id. at 534.
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seizures which are "unreasonable." If a particular investigative
practice was accepted in England at the time of ratification, it
might be assumed to be reasonable, or at least not prohibited,
by the Fourth Amendment.
There is, of course, a major flaw in this assumption. That
is that the Bill of Rights in general, and the Fourth Amendment in particular, were in large measure a repudiation of
English practices which were considered intolerable. For example, the use of general warrants to carry out indiscriminate
searches was considered particularly abusive. In this case,
however, the particular language of the Fourth Amendment
addressed the matter by mandating that warrants particularly
describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
Insofar as the Amendment did not specifically provide answers,
the default expectation was that established law enforcement
procedures were unaffected. ' °
The answer, then, to the riddle of the detention of material
witnesses might simply be resolved by the revelation that the
practice was well-established in England during the colonial
era. Indeed, in 1971, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
said precisely that. In Bacon v. United States,' the court reassured the readers of its opinion that the detention of material
witnesses was hardly extraordinary, because it was "consonant
with the long established rule of English Law, in effect when
the United States became a nation." 2 ' To support this state-

'
See Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98
MICH. L. REV. 547 (1999), for a definitive study of the original meaning of the
Fourth Amendment and its relation to the common law.
121 449 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1971).
'" Id. at 938-39. The suggestion that the power granted by the federal material witness law to detain witnesses prior to the failure to comply with a subpoena was established at common law has been asserted by a number of commentators. See Roberto Iraola, Terrorism, Grand Juries, and the Federal Material Witness Statute, 34 ST. MARY'S L.J. 401, 405 n.19 (2003); Stacey M. Studnicki, Material Witness Detention: Justice Served or Denied?, 40 WAYNE L. REV. 1533, 153436 (1994); Christina M. Ceballos, Comment, Adjustment of Status for Alien Material Witnesses: Is It Coming Three Years Too Late?, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 75, 82
(1999); Comment, Cessante Ratione Legis Cessat Ipsa Lex (The Plight of the Detained Material Witness), 7 CATH. U. L. REV. 37, 37-38 (1958). The evidence presented to support this conclusion is unconvincing. Given that the trial of the
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ment, the court cited a single English case that was decided in
1612.123 It would appear to be the only case cited by this or
any other court for the long established rule of English Law.
The intrepid academic who succeeds in tracking this one down
among the dusty tomes in rarely visited library stacks may be
excused for saying, "this better be a good one."
The case is styled the Countess of Shrewsbury's Trial,'24
and this is her story: at apparently some time in the early part
of the seventeenth century, one Lady Arabella Stuart married
Sir William Seymour. Arabella was a first cousin of James I.
She was a Catholic, and at one point, the Pope had a grand
design for an arranged marriage that would put Arabella on
the English throne. The plot failed, and James became firmly
ensconced as monarch, but he remained apprehensive regarding her children having claim to the throne. To that end, he
forbade the marriage of Arabella to William Seymour. They
nonetheless were secretly married. In the words of the court
reporter, "[bleing a marriage with one so nearly related in
blood to the king, and without his consent, it was deemed an
offence [sic] against the royal prerogative, on which account
lady Arabella and her husband were imprisoned; the former in
a private house at Lambeth, the latter in the Tower."1 " They

Countess of Shrewsbury would appear to be the only pre-American revolution
decision cited by courts or commentators illustrative of the practice and that the
decision fails to support the claim, skepticism would seem justified. The misunderstanding appears to have resulted from the confusion of the power to compel
testimony (never questioned) and the power to detain in anticipation of testifying.
For example, Studnicki captions a section of her article, supra, "The Common
Law Power to Detain a Witness." The text, however, speaks only to the power to
compel testimony and to punish those who defied a subpoena.
But see Ricardo J. Bascuas, The Unconstitutionality of "Hold Until Cleared"Reexamining Material Witness Detentions in the Wake of the September 11th Dragnet, 58 VAND. L. REV. 677, 706-07 (2005) ("If the Bacon court's history is correct,
it means that the Founding Fathers themselves authorized the incarceration of
individuals who were not even suspected of committing a crime. As history and
common sense have it, the Bacon court got history wrong.") (footnote omitted).
113 Bacon, 449 F.2d at 938-39 (citing Countess of Shrewsbury's Trial, 2 How.
St. Tr. 769 (1612)).
124 2 How. St. Tr. 769 (1612).
12
Id. at 769 (footnote omitted).
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both managed to escape and fled in separate ships to France,
King James' men captured Arabella before she reached Calais,
and she was returned to the Tower. She died there, never seeing William again.
Mary Talbot, the Countess of Shrewsbury, was Arabella's
aunt. She was suspected of abetting this scheme, having prior
knowledge of both the wedding and the escape. When called
before the Privy Council, however, she refused to divulge any
information. As a result, she too ended up in the Tower and
was brought before a select council "charged with a high and
great contempt of dangerous consequence."1 26 According to the
case report, Lady Arabella "had no evil intent against the
king,"'27 but had simply been corrupted by her evil aunt. "And
the lords of the Privy Council, knowing the arcana imperii
[state secrets], did shew [sic] divers perilous consequences, and
the rather for this, that the said countess is an obstinate
popish recusant, and as was said, perverted also the lady
Arabella." 25
The Countess of Shrewsbury proffered two arguments in
her defense: (1) "she had made a rash vow that she would not
declare any thing in particular touching the said points; and for
that (as she said) it was better to obey God than man,"" 9 and
(2) "[slhe stood upon her privilege of nobility." 30 The court
found both defenses unavailing, holding that "the countess by
her allegiance was bound, without being demanded, to reveal to
the king what she knows concerning the premises, upon which
great mischief may happen to the king and the realm."'

"
121
128

129

Id. at 770 (footnote omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.

-" Id. at 770-71.
...Id. at 775. Addressing Lady Arabella, Sir Francis Bacon said:
For that which you are properly charged with, you must know that all
subjects, without distinction of degrees, owe to the king tribute and
service, not only of their deed and hand, but of their knowledge and
discovery. If there be any thing that imports the king's service, they
ought themselves undemanded to impart it; much more if they be called
and examined, whether it be of their own fact or of another's, they
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As is readily apparent, the Shrewsbury decision provides
no support for the notion that the English common law recognized a power to detain material witnesses. The Countess of
Shrewsbury was not a material witness; rather, she was a
party "charged with a high and great contempt."1 32 While the
charge against her arose out of her refusal to testify, the substantive charge of abetting the illegal marriage and escape of
Lady Arabella arose prior to the time she was taken into custody.
For at least a half century prior to the trial of the Countess
the law of England authorized compelling the
Shrewsbury,
of
testimony of witnesses in criminal and civil cases. The Second
Act of Phillip and Mary in 1555 empowered justices to bind
over witnesses to give evidence against defendants in felony
cases. 133 And in 1562, the Statute of Elizabeth provided that
in civil cases, any person who refused to testify after being
served with process would be subject to a ten pound fine as
well as damages for the harm caused to the aggrieved party."' Under neither statute, however, was there any recognition of a power to detain witnesses in anticipation of their
giving evidence. Similarly, the criminal defendant's right to the
compulsory process of witnesses was recognized by the Act of
William III in 1695, which gave parties indicted for treason
"like [Process] of the Court where they [sihall be tried, to compel their [Witnesses] to appear for them at any [siuch Trial or
Trials, as is [usually] granted to compel [Witnesses] to appear
[against] them."'3 5 Again, however, there is no suggestion in
the law that a potential witness could be incarcerated to insure
his presence at the trial.
Moreover, sixteen years after the Countess of Shrewsbury's
case, on June 7, 1628, the House of Commons, under the leadership of Sir Edward Coke, enacted the Petition of Right, which
ought to make direct answer.
Id. at 778.
Id. at 770.
"
' Marian Committal Statute, 1555, 2 & 3 Phil. & M., c. 10, § 2 (Eng.).
'
1562, 5 Eliz., c. 9, § 12 (Eng.).
135 1695, 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 3, § 7 (Eng.).
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sought to reinvigorate the principles of liberty articulated in
Magna Carta. 3 ' In the matter of individual liberty, in petitioning Charles I it observed that, notwithstanding laws to the
contrary, including Magna Carta, "divers of your subjects have
of late been imprisoned without any cause shewed [sic]," and
that when challenges were brought, certain individuals "were
returned back to several prisons, without being charged with
any thing to which they might make answer according to the
law." 37 The Members of the House concluded by
humbly pray[ing] ... that your Majesty would be... gra-

ciously pleased, for the further comfort and safety of your
people, to declare your royal will and pleasure, [tihat in the
things aforesaid all our officers and ministers shall serve you
according to the law and statutes of this realm, as they tender the honour [sic] of your Majesty, and the prosperity of
this kingdom. 3 '
Finally, insofar as the common law in the United States is
concerned, both federal and state courts have rejected the notion of a common law power to detain material witnesses prior
to failure to honor a subpoena.13 9

- See SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 62, 62 (Richard L. Perry & John C. Cooper
eds., New York 1964) ("The Petition of Right was 'the first of those great constitutional documents since Magna Carta, which safeguard the liberties of the people
by securing the supremacy of the law.' It has also been called 'the second Great
Charter of the liberties of England' and 'the first great official interpretation of
Magna Carta since the time of Edward III.-) (footnotes omitted) (quoting WILLIAM
HOLDSWORTH, 5 A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 449 (1927); THOMAS MACAULAY, THE
HISTORY OF ENGLAND 74 (Charles H. Firth ed., 1913-15); RODNEY L. MOTT, DUE
PROCESS OF LAW 81 (1926)).
137 Petition of Right (1628) sec. V, reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES,
supra note 136, at 74.
1
Id. at sec. XI.
1
See Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933, 939 (9th Cir. 1971); State v.
Hand, 242 A.2d 888, 892 (Essex. County Ct. 1968); Little v. Territory, 114 P.2d
699, 699 (Okla. 1911); Bates v. Kitchel, 125 N.W. 684, 686 (Mich. 1910); Comfort
v. Kittle, 46 N.W. 988 (Iowa 1890); Bickley v. Commonwealth, 25 Ky. (2 J.J.
Marsh.) 572, 572 (1829); cf. Crosby v. Potts, 69 S.E. 582, 582-83 (Ga. Ct. App.
1910) (indicating how early English common law compelled witnesses to testify for
the government). See also Ronald L. Carlson, Jailing the Innocent: The Plight of
the Material Witness, 55 IOWA L. REV. 1, 20-25 (1969) (discussing the status of
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SEARCHING FOR A SOLUTION

If, then we can find no conventional support for sustaining
such detentions, the possibility remains that, at least in the
case of thwarting terrorism, we may be justified in developing a
theory from whole cloth. This approach is reflected in much of
the rhetoric of governmental officials. Following 9/11, Attorney
General Ashcroft was quoted as saying that henceforth, it
would be necessary for federal law enforcement to "'think outside the box."' 14° Interpreted in the most favorable light, this
observation may be read as suggesting that the protection of
the Fourth Amendment is malleable and that reasonableness is
in part a function of the felt necessities of the time.
There is precedent for interpreting the Fourth Amendment
to accommodate the pressing needs of a particular historical
period. For example, both the vehicle exception"" and the
open fields exception"4 to the warrant requirement were developed during the Prohibition era and at least in part were
concessions to the fact that liquor laws could not be enforced
effectively so long as officers could not search the vehicles of
bootleggers or ferret out moonshine stills in remote locations
without prior judicial authorization. In our own time, and long
before 9/11, courts have sustained the practice of searching persons and hand-carried luggage in airports as a means of
thwarting airline hijacking. A few years earlier, the same intrusions would have been condemned as patently unconstitutional.
the material witness law in various states); Robert Odlin Coyle, Comment, Confining Material Witnesses in Criminal Cases, 20 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 164, 164-68

(1963) (discussing the rights of a material witness); Comment, Pretrial Detention
of Witnesses, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 700, 700-34 (discussing the balance between the
interests of the state and the individual); Bernard Silverman, Comment, Material
Witnesses in Criminal Proceedings: Securing and Assuring Their Attendance, 18

Mo. L. REV. 38, 38-53 (1953) (suggesting ways that material witness laws may be
improved).
" General Larry D. Thomson, U.S. Deputy Attorney Gen., Remarks Delivered
to the National Black Prosecutors Association (Aug. 8, 2002), http://www.usdoj.gov/
dag/speechI2002080802nbparemarks.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2006).
'" Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
14 Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
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In practice, today the material witness statute is rarely
used in other than terrorist-related investigations. Prior to
9/11, it had been used almost exclusively by the Immigration
and Naturalization Service in illegal immigration investigations.' But the fact that the power is rarely used is far from
reassuring. For if we accept the unchallenged assumption that
the law is constitutional, it means upon a proper showing of
risk, either (a) material witnesses in all cases may be detained
indefinitely should federal prosecutors choose to use their power more liberally, or (b) the only parties at risk are material
witnesses that match the profile of previously identified terrorists.
If the first reading is correct-if prosecutors have the constitutional right to detain any material witness upon no more of a
showing than the prosecutor's averment that the witness will
likely not honor a subpoena-then surely the practice deserves
constitutional scrutiny. If, on the other hand, the law is only
used as a weapon against terrorism, and only individuals who
fall within a class of suspected terrorists are vulnerable, then
there are different reasons to voice constitutional concern.
Over a half century ago, this country subjected a significant number of its citizens to involuntary internment for no
reason other than their being of Japanese heritage. While that
action was sustained by the Supreme Court,' it is not a celebrated episode in American history.'4 5

143

See Witness to Abuse, supra note 1, at 14 (footnotes omitted) (citing Bureau

of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Compendium of Federal Justice Statistics, 2000, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/cfjs00.htm.):
Before September 11, the vast majority of persons arrested as material witnesses were non-U.S. citizens arrested by the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). In 2000, for example, 94 percent
of the 4,168 federal material witness arrests were made by the INS, and
less than 2 percent were citizens. Most of the material witnesses arrested by the INS were immigrants who were smuggled into the country,
and the INS sought to ensure their testimony in trials against the
smugglers before the witnesses left the country.
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
,' See John M. Burkoff, "A Flame of Fire"."The Fourth Amendment in Perilous
'"
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And yet, some may nonetheless argue that today the risks
are too high: that those who share a cultural and/or religious
affinity with our avowed enemy may either return to their
homeland or otherwise accept that their identity subjects them
to greater scrutiny. In other words, it is simply a question of
survival.
We have heard this argument before, and in a context
similar to that of Osama Awadallah. On June 28, 1954, Lloyd
Barenblatt was subpoenaed to testify before the House UnAmerican Activities Committee at the height of the Red
Scare. 146 Barenblatt declined to answer five questions regarding his knowledge of Communist Party activities at the University of Michigan. " " One of the questions concerned his knowledge of the Communist Party affiliation of a named individual. 44 For his refusal to answer, Barenblatt was held in contempt. " 9 The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.5 ° A
majority of the Court was prepared to give deference to Congress regarding the magnitude of the problem it addressed and
the appropriate way of responding to it. 5 ' Four Justices, however, dissented.'5 2 Justice Black, in an impassioned opinion
denied that, in this case, "First Amendment freedoms must be
abridged in order to 'preserve' our country."'5 3 "That notion,"
he said, "rests on the unarticulated premise that this Nation's

Times, 74 Miss. L.J. 631, 652 (2004) ("[Sluspending or ignoring the Fourth
Amendment and other constitutional protections in perilous times, even in times
of legitimate and serious threats to our national security, was not only not productive, it was instead destructive of our constitutional fabric, and of our selfcongratulatory claims, trumpeted throughout the world, that we are a nation of
democratic virtues governed by the fair and even-handed application of the rule of
law.").
"
Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
1 Id. at 114.
148 Id.
"9
"'

Id. at 115.
Id. at 134.

151 Id.

Id. at 134, 166. Justice Black filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief
Justice Warren and Justice Douglas joined. Id. at 134. Justice Brennan filed a
dissenting opinion. Id. at 166.
" Id. at 145 (Black. J., dissenting).
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security hangs upon its power to punish people because of what
they think, speak or write about, or because of those with
"
whom they associate for political purposes. ""
Barenblatt would not speak to his knowledge regarding
Francis Crowley.'
Awadallah disavowed that he knew
Khalid Al-Mihdhar' 5 6 Never mind the fact that in both cases
the interrogator undoubtedly already knew the answers to the
questions, so the witness was not withholding otherwise inaccessible information. Never mind that it strains credulity to
believe that Barenblatt's responses would be vital to the drafting of anti-communist legislation or that Awadallah's would be
vital to the war against terrorism. In both cases, the failure to
respond satisfactorily to their inquisitors culminated in a citation for contempt.
Notwithstanding the claim of the Justice Department that
each of the detained witnesses had information relevant to
potential prosecutions for terrorist activities, at least thirty of
the seventy individuals examined in the Human Rights Watch
study never appeared before a grand jury or at a trial as witnesses, and "only seven were ever arrested on terrorism-related
charges."'5 7 And yet, "[olne-third of the seventy 5 ...
witness8
months."
two
least
at
for
incarcerated
.
were
es . .
The challenge to our system of justice and the rule of law
could not be clearer: how can we remain true to the values of
the freest society the world has ever known while responding
effectively to those who would destroy us? In his seminal work,
A Theory of Justice, philosopher John Rawls referred to this
dilemma as the obligation in a democratic society to "tolerate[]
... the intolerant."'5 9 Rawls allowed "that an intolerant sect
has no title to complain when it is denied an equal liberty,"

154

15
1

Id.
Id. at 114 (majority opinion).
Awadallah I, 202 F. Supp. 2d 82, 87 (S.D.N.Y.

2002), rev'd, 349 F. 3d 42

(2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied sub nom. Awadallah v. United States, 543 U.S. 1056
(2005), aff'd, 436 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2006).
1" Witness to Abuse, supra note 1, at 2.
'
Id. at 3.
9 JOHN RAWIs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 90 (rev. ed. 1999).
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because "[a] person's right to complain is limited to violations
of principles he acknowledges himself."' But, he continued,
it did not follow from this that the tolerant have the right to
suppress the intolerant.16" ' Only in those instances in which
"they sincerely and with reason believe that intolerance is
necessary for their own security" can they legitimately draw
the line.'6 2 The governing principle, according to Rawls, was
this:
[Just citizens should strive to preserve the constitution with
all its equal liberties as long as liberty itself and their own
freedom are not in danger. They can properly force the intolerant to respect the liberty of others .... But when the
constitution itself is secure, there is no reason to deny freedom to the intolerant. 16
"The leading principle," Rawls concluded, "is to establish a just
constitution with the liberties of equal citizenship." 64 Our response to the intolerant "should be guided by the principles of
justice and not by the fact that the unjust cannot complain.' 65
During the course of my remarks, I have, somewhat randomly, shifted my focus between two dimensions of the issue
before us. At the broader constitutional level, I have suggested
that there are serious reasons to question the per se legitimacy
of detaining material witnesses. In the context of contemporary
practice, I have called attention to the aggravated circumstances in which the law is being used in the investigation of terrorist activities. But I am not suggesting that the use of the power
in this category of cases is uniquely troubling; rather, I have
focused on such cases simply because that is where the power
is being used today. Simply because the law is being used pri-

160 Id.

.1 Id. at 191.
" Id. at 192. "Justice does not require that men must stand idly by while
others destroy the basis of their existence." Id.
16

1'

Id.

Id. at 193.

165 Id.
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marily against an insular and largely unpopular minority is not
reason to ignore the constitutional question. Indeed, it provides
all the more reason to do so.
In the post-9/11 world, it is an unfortunate happenstance
to be named "Osama." Perhaps the prudent Middle Easterner
would shorten his name to "Sam." But it is no crime to fail to
do so.
EPILOGUE: THE CONTINUING SAGA OF OSAMA AWADALLAH

Notwithstanding that Osama Awadallah has never been
convicted or even charged with any crime related to the events
of September 11, 2001,66 federal authorities have continued
their relentless pursuit of a perjury conviction based upon
Awadallah's denials that he was acquainted with one of the
terrorists and that the handwriting in an examination booklet
was his. Awadallah was released on bail in November 2001,
thereafter graduated from Grossmont College and enrolled as a
full-time student at San Diego State University.'6 7
At a pretrial conference on May 16, 2005, the prosecution
submitted a supplemental list of witnesses that it might call at
the trial for perjury. 65 When the defense requested identification of these witnesses, the prosecution declined, maintaining
that it was not required to do so prior to trial. 6 ' The trial
court ordered the prosecution to do so, whereupon it disclosed
that the witnesses included several members of the grand jury

1"
The prosecution nevertheless endeavored to associate Awadallah with those
events at his trial, which ended in a mistrial apparently as a result of the emotional element which pervaded the jury deliberations. United States v. Awadallah
(Awadallah VI), No. 01 CR 1026 (SAS), 2006 WL 2242442, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
3, 2006). Although Judge Scheindlin "admonished the jury that Awadallah was
not charged with participating in the September 11 attacks," the prosecution
began and ended its closing argument "with an appeal to recall that this case
involved 'the worst terrorist attacks in [this/our] nation's history."' Id. at *5 &
n.53 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). Judge Scheindlin observed that the
"problem was undoubtedly exacerbated" by this tactic. Id. at *5 n.53.

"6 United States v. Awadallah (Awadallah II), 401 F. Supp. 2d 308, 312

(S.D.N.Y. 2005), aff'd, 436 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2006).
168

Id.

169 Id.
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that had returned the indictment against Awadallah. 70
In explaining the relevance of the testimony of these witnesses, the prosecution referred to Awadallah's indicated defense "'that any incorrect statements he may have made in his
October 10 grand jury testimony were not knowingly made [but
were] the result of memory lapse, misunderstanding, exhaustion, confusion and intimidation.'""' "To rebut this defense,"
the prosecution intended "to call the grand jurors to testify to
their impressions of Awadallah as he testified-namely that 'he
neither appeared nor behaved as if he were confused or conversely that he appeared lucid or coherent."'"
At the time of
this request, the prosecution had already contacted and interviewed many if not all of the members of the grand jury."'
Upon learning of this, counsel for Awadallah "requested permission to contact the grand jurors to determine whether he
might wish to call any of them as trial witnesses." 4 The trial
court thereupon wrote each of the grand jurors to determine if
any would be willing to be interviewed by defense and six jurors agreed.'7 5
On May 24, 2005, the court made a preliminary ruling on
the admissibility of the proposed testimony. It ruled "that the
grand jurors [could] testify as to the physical conditions of the
room during Awadallah's grand jury testimony, Awadallah's
physical appearance, and the behavior and manner of the prosecutor."17 The court also ruled "that the grand jurors may not
testify as to whether, in their opinion, Awadallah's testimony
was knowingly false, or whether Awadallah appeared 'confused'
during his testimony."1 77

170 Id.
172

Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Def.'s Reqs to Charge No. 3, at 5).
Id. (quoting Government's Letter of May 23, 2005).

173

Id.

1

Id.
"' Id. "[Olne juror informed the Court that he was not willing to talk to Mr.
Berman [counsel for Awadallah]; two more jurors were unwilling to be contacted
by Mr. Berman, but asked that the Court give them Mr. Berman's number, so
they could contact him if they chose." Id. at 312-13.
116 Id. at 313.
177 Id.
174
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Both parties urged the trial court to reconsider the ruling,
the defense contending that the testimony should not be permitted at all, and the prosecution maintaining that the scope of
testimony had been improperly restricted." 8 After due consideration, the trial court's final order was essentially an elaboration of its preliminary ruling:
[Tihe grand jurors are precluded from testifying as to their
subjective impressions. However, the grand jurors are not
precluded from testifying as to objective physical conditions
and events in the may [sic] draw its own conclusions from the
grand jurors' testimony as to physical facts; the danger that
the trial jurors will simply defer to the grand jury's opinion of
Awadallah's intent is not present if the testimony is so limited....

Accordingly, the grand jurors may testify as to, e.g., the
temperature, layout and occupancy of the room, or whether
anyone raised their voice or made any threatening physical
gestures, or whether Awadallah showed signs of physical
injury. However, they may not testify as to their mental impressions: i.e., that Awadallah did or did not appear lucid or
the proscomposed, or did or did not appear confused, or7 that
9
ecutor did or did not appear to be intimidating.
The prosecution appealed this ruling to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which affirmed.180 In its appeal,
the prosecution also requested that on remand the case be
assigned to a different district judge "'to preserve the appearance of justice.'" 8 ' The court of appeals observed that no such
request had been made by the Office of the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York since 1973, and in
all the cases cited by the prosecution in support, the request
had been made by the defendant, or initiated by the court itself
on the defendant's behalf.8 The court denied the motion,

178

Id.

"

at 320.
United States v. Awadallah (Awadallah V), 436 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2006).

"

Id. at 135.

1

Id.

...Id. at 128.
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finding no support for the prosecution's contention that the
trial judge had either acted as an advocate for the defendant or
prejudged ultimate issues favorable to the defendant."8
On May 23, 2005, the day prior to the pretrial conference
at which the court made its preliminary ruling,
[Tihe parties selected a panel of twelve jurors and three alternate jurors.... The [final] ruling was published... on May

31 and the Government immediately filed an appeal. The jury
had not yet been sworn,... [and the trial judge] informed
that jury that "unforeseen events and circumstances prevent
us from going forward with this case at this time." [The judge
then] gave the [jury] the following instructions:
So what happens next is that your jury service is over
without this trial proceeding at this time. When we can
proceed, we will call all of you. And if you are able to
serve, in other words, if you're not out of town or in
some other way unavailable, if you're able to come back
and serve, we will keep this jury. But we can't ask you
to put your lives on hold. So you can go back to our
work, go back to your plans, go back to your summer
vacations, because we can't tell you the exact date. But
when that date comes, and it could be days, could be
more, we will call you. And if you're available, you are
the jury in this case and that's what we'll do.l"l
The court of appeals affirmed the evidentiary ruling on
January 26, 2006, and on February 10, the trial judge notified
the fifteen panel members that the trial was to commence on
April 17, and asked each juror whether he or she would be
available and if not to provide an explanation." The prosecution contended that to recall any of the jurors on the panel
would violate the Jury Service and Selection Act, which provides that "all litigants in Federal courts entitled to trial by

U3

Id.

at 135-37.

1" United States v. Awadallah (Awadallah V), No. 01 CR. 1026(SAS), 2006 WL
738407, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2006) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Awadallah III,
401 F. Supp. 2d 308, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), aft'd, 436 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2006);
Transcript of Record at 11-12).
'a' Id. at *2.
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jury shall have the right to grand and petit juries selected at
random from a fair cross section of the community in the district or division wherein the court convenes."" 6 The parties
agreed that if all fifteen previously chosen jurors were available
to serve, the trial could proceed.'87 The defense argued that
using less than all of the properly selected jurors did not violate the Act, and that to hold otherwise would "reward[] the
[prosecution] for taking an appeal on which it failed to prevail."' The prosecution responded that to use some but not
all of the prior panel would be tantamount to impaneling "volunteer[]" jurors, a practice which had been held to violate the
Act.189

The trial court responded that the recalled jurors could not
properly be considered volunteers, because they had been instructed that their obligation to serve had not ended.9s The
original panel had been "'selected at random from a fair cross
section of the community,'" and no argument had been put
forward that the recall would result in "'impermissible discrimination against individuals or group.'" ' ' Rather, the jurors
would all remain obligated to serve, absent an individual showing of "'undue hardship or extreme inconvenience.' 19s2 The
court concluded that no substantial violation of the Act would
result.'93
At the same time, the court noted that while the defendant
had a significant interest in have his fate determined by the
jury first impaneled, the prosecution had "a countervailing
interest in the opportunity to choose a complete jury at once,
using its peremptory strikes strategically to obtain a desired
whole."'9 4 To this end, it ruled that all recalled jurors would

'
"'

28 U.S.C. § 1861 (2000).
Awadallah V, 2006 WL 738407, at *3.
Id. at *3.
I/d.

"'
"'
"'
193

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

194 Id.

at *4-5.
at *4 (citations omitted).
(citation omitted)
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be subjected to a renewed voir dire examination. Any juror
not excused for cause [would] be seated as part of the panel of
thirty-five people from which the jury and alternates shall be
chosen. Additional voir dire [would] be conducted to complete
th[e] panel. [Thereafter both parties would] be entitled to use
peremptory strikes in the usual manner. " '
In May of 2006, the proceedings against Awadallah culminated in a mistrial.'9 6 Thereafter, Awadallah moved for a
change of venue, citing the fact that "[diuring the 'emotionally
heated jury deliberations,' some jurors 'were tearfully discussing their September 11 recollections in the jury room.' This...
convinced Awadallah that 'New Yorkers are too close to the
events of September 11, 2001' for him to receive a fair trial in
the Southern District of New York."'97 The court found the
argument less compelling than other cases in which the issue
was raised, because Awadallah was charged with perjury, not
terrorism. 9 ' Nonetheless, the court acknowledged that the
evidence adduced regarding the deliberations in Awadallah's
trial revealed bias in the jury deliberations.'9 9 "Thus," the
judge cautioned, "the first deliberation should be treated as a
miner's canary, alerting all parties to the possibility of dangerous prejudice flowing from jurors' personal experiences of the
September 11 attacks."0 0 She nevertheless concluded that the
problem would not likely be alleviated, and might indeed be
exacerbated, by moving the trial to another venue, and the
motion was denied.2 0°

'O,Id.
196 Awadallah VI, No. 01 CR 1026 (SAS), 2006 WL 2242442 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3,
2006).
'" Id. at *1 (footnote omitted) (quoting Letter from Sarah Kunstler, Counsel to
Defendant, to the Court (May 20, 2006) (on file with the court)).
"' Id. at *4. The court distinguished the Timothy McVeigh case, in which the
trial was moved from Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, to Denver, Colorado.
199 Id. at *5.
200 Id.
2' Id. Judge Scheindlin offered three reasons for her conclusion: (1) "[Tlhe

effects of the September 11 attacks were felt nationwide, and there is no reason
to believe that jurors in a different jurisdiction would lack an emotional response
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On the fifth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, the case of
Osama Awadallah appeared no nearer to resolution than on
the day of his arrest, September 21, 2001.

with prejudicial effects." Id. (2) The likelihood of 'intensive publicity" might be
greater in a small city than in Manhattan. Id. (quoting United States v.
Dioguardi, 428 F.2d 1033, 1039 (2d Cir. 1970)). (3) "ITihe Southern District of
New York serves one of the country's most 'diverse cross-section of ethnicities,
backgrounds, and experiences," reducing the potential for local bias. Id. (quoting
United States v. White, No. 02 CR. 1111, 2003 WL 721567, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
28, 2003)).

